









Monitoring approaches to consciousness claim that a mental state is conscious when it is 
suitably monitored. Higher-order monitoring theory makes the monitoring state and the 
monitored state logically independent. Same-order monitoring theory claims a constitutive, 
non-contingent connection between the monitoring state and the monitored state. In this 
paper, I articulate different versions of the same-order monitoring theory and argue for its 





the	 Higher-Order	 Monitoring	 Theory	 of	 Consciousness.	 According	 to	 the	
Higher-Order	Monitoring	Theory,	what	 it	 is	 like	 to	be	in	a	conscious	state,	
and	there	being	anything	it	is	like	to	be	in	it,	are	determined	by	the	way	the	















This	 label	 was	 devised,	 independently,	 by	
Brook	(Ms),	Kriegel	(2002),	and	Lurz	(2003).	
It	no	doubt	characterizes	some	of	the	accounts	



























But	I	hope	that	 the	discussion	of	 the	subtler	developments	of	 the	approach	
will	interest	also	those	with	no	sympathy	for	it,	if	only	because	doing	away	
with	 the	 monitoring	 approach	 to	 consciousness	 would	 presumably	 require	
squaring	off	with	its	best	version.	It	is	therefore	worthwhile	to	consider	what	
the	best	version	is.


















dimensions	 along	 which	 they	 might	 contrast	 with	 each	 other.	 Perhaps	 the	
most	widely	acknowledged	distinction	is	between	versions	that	construe	the	
higher-order	 representation	 as	 perception-like	 and	 versions	 that	 construe	 it	
as	thought-like.	Thus,	according	to	Rosenthal,	a	higher-order	representation	


























ate	 representation	of	M,	and	 (iii)	 there	 is	no	 constitutive	 relation	
between	M	and	M*.
(SOMT)	 For	any	mental	state	M	of	a	subject	S,	M	is	conscious	iff	there	is	









HOMT:	 Aquila	 (1990),	 Byrne	 (1997),	 Cas-
ton	 (2002),	 Dretske	 (1993,	 1995),	 Goldman	
(1993),	 Guzeldere	 (1995),	 Kriegel	 (2003a),	
Levine	 (2001),	Lurz	 (2003a,	2003b),	Moran	
(2001),	 Natsoulas	 (1993),	 Neander	 (1998),	
Rey	(1988),	and	Seager	(1999)	develop	some	
of	 them.	 Some	 of	 these	 arguments	 may	 ap-
ply	 to	SOMT	as	well,	 though	some	of	 them	
clearly	do	not.	
3
Both	 premises	 1	 and	 3	 can	 certainly	 be	 de-
nied.	In	particular,	Dretske	(1993)	argues	that	
a	mental	state’s	status	as	conscious	does	not	
require	 that	 its	 subject	be	aware	of	 it.	 I	will	
not	discuss	this	issue	here,	as	it	is	tangential	






is	 higher-order	 represented	 but	 is	 still	 non-
conscious	involves	a	person	who	learns	of	a	
repressed	 emotion	 or	 belief	 through	 therapy	
and	comes	to	represent	to	herself	that	she	has	




resented.	 This	 issue	 will	 be	 discussed	 more	
fully	in	§4.
5
The	 way	 I	 frame	 the	 distinction	 between	
SOMT	 and	 HOMT,	 the	 “constitutive	 rela-
tion	 requirement”	 is	not	 suggested	 to	be	 the	
only	requirement	on	an	appropriate	higher-or-
der	 representation.	That	 is,	 an	 “appropriate”	
higher-order	 representation	 may	 be	 required	
to	exhibit	other	features,	beyond	the	require-
ment	 of	 being	 constitutively	 related	 to	 the	
conscious	 state.	 However,	 most	 versions	 of	
SOMT	 would	 probably	 see	 this	 as	 the	 key	
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(SOMT1’)	 For	any	mental	 state	M,	M	 is	conscious	 iff	M	 is	an	appropriate	
representation	of	itself.8
This	 sort	 of	 view	 has	 been	 recently	 defended	 by	 Caston	 (2002),	 Kriegel	





ing	 of	 how	 this	 is	 possible	 would	 be	 continuous	 with	 familiar	 naturalistic	
accounts	of	mental	representation.	This	last	requirement	is	particularly	prob-
lematic	 for	SOMT1:	 there	may	be	principled	barriers	 to	a	 reconciliation	of	
























































In	 the	 remainder	 of	 this	 section,	 I	 articulate	
several	specific	versions	of	SOMT.	The	main	
purpose	is	not	to	evaluate	these	versions,	but	
to	 try	 and	 articulate	 the	 conceptual	 founda-


















resentation	of	 itself	has	 to	be	appropriate	 in	
other	ways	as	well,	in	case	the	constitutive	re-
lation	requirement	is	not	the	only	requirement	














marily)	 a	 spatial	 or	 temporal	 part-whole	 re-








it	 will	 take	 us	 too	 far	 afield,	 but	 it	 may	 be	
worthwhile	to	just	state	the	logical	properties	
of	 the	relation	of	proper	parthood:	 it	 is	anti-
reflexive	 (x	 cannot	 be	 a	part	 of	 itself),	 anti-
symmetrical	 (if	x	 is	 a	proper	part	 of	y,	 then	
y	is	not	a	proper	part	of	x),	and	transitive	(if	
x	is	a	proper	part	of	y	and	y is	proper	part	of	































































the	 appeal	 to	 two	 separate	 logical	parts	may	make	 room	 for	 a	 causal	 rela-
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logical	 part-whole	 relation	 is	 accepted,	 so	











an	 intrinsic	property	of	 those	states.	On	 this	
account,	 the	 MET	 is	 part	 of	 the	 conscious	












pausing	 to	 articulate.	 François	 Recanati	 (in	
conversation)	 also	 expressed	 sympathy	 for	
this	sort	of	view.
19
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One	way	 to	 capture	 the	ontological	 difference	between	 these	 two	versions	
of	 SOMT4	 is	 through	 the	 mereological	 distinction	 between	 complexes	 and	
(mere)	sums	(Simons	1987:	Ch.	9).	A	complex	is	a	sum	whose	parts	are	essen-
tially	interconnected,	or	bound,	in	a	certain	way.	The	interconnection	between	

























tion	 introduction”,	 as	 when	 one	 consciously	
infers	 that	 the	 wall	 is	 white	 and	 rectangular	

















our	 cognitive	 system.	Any	 process	 in	 which	
two	separate	mental	states	or	contents	are	uni-
fied	in	such	a	way	that	they	are	superseded	by	
a	 single	mental	 state	or	 content	 that	 encom-
passes	both	will	qualify	as	a	process	of	cogni-
tive	integration.	(For	a	specific	discussion	of	
how	 such	 information	 integration	may	work	




















At	 least	 this	 is	 how	 I	 understand	 Gennaro’s	
and	 Van	 Gulick’s	 views	 as	 they	 appear	 in	
print.	 It	 is	quite	possible	 that	 I	am	misinter-
preting	one	or	both	of	them.	My	primary	in-
terest,	 however,	 is	 in	 the	 views	 themselves,	
not	so	much	in	the	exegesis	of	Gennaro	and	
Van	 Gulick’s	 work.	 In	 particular,	 some	 pas-
sages	in	Gennaro’s	work	may	suggest	that	he	
is	more	of	a	complex	theorist	than	a	sum	the-
orist	 (see	 especially	 Gennaro	 1996:	 29–30).	
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state	and	 the	second-order	 representation	of	 it	 are	not	 integrated	 through	a	






















between	 M*	 and	 M◊.	 The	 result,	 then,	 is	 a	







does	 not.	 When	 the	 whole	 in	 question	 is	 a	
mere	 sum,	 (direct)	 representation	 of	 its	 part	






certain	 way,	 then	 representation	 of	 the	 door	




cabinet	 does,	 representation	 of	 the	 door	 can	
double	as	representation	of	the	larger	unit	of	







As	 Siewert	 notes	 –	 though	 not	 in	 so	 many	
words	–	we	can	ascribe	to	her	a	complex	of	
the	first-order	judgment	and	the	second-order	
judgment;	 but	we	 still	 cannot	 ascribe	 to	 her	




bit	 more	 complicated	 and	 compounds	 other	
implausibilities.	Thus,	according	to	Gennaro	
M*	 is	 an	unconscious	part	 of	 the	conscious	
state	 that	 M	 is.	 This	 is	 doubly	 implausible.	
First,	 although	 mental	 states	 are	 bearers	 of	
the	property	of	being	conscious,	it	is	not	clear	
in	 what	 sense	 state-parts	 can	 be	 said	 to	 be	
conscious	or	unconscious;	 and	 second,	even	
if	there	was	a	sense	in	which	state-parts	could	










such	 relations	would	make	his	 view	a	 com-
plex	view	rather	than	a	sum	view.	In	response,	
it	 may	 be	 claimed	 that	 temporal	 and	 spatial	







































ing	 conscious,	 because	 conscious	 states	 are	 states	 the	 subject	 is	 aware	 of,	
and	awareness	of	something	involves	representation	of	it.	I	also	noted	that	a	
higher-order	representation	of	M	is	not	a	sufficient	condition	for	M’s	being	
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ally	is	distressed	or	anxious	about	something	(e.g.,	a	looming	banquet	with	














































that	 it	 is	 disposed	 to	 bring	 about	 the	 occur-
rence	of	an	M*-type	state.	This	inferential	role	
determines	the	content	of	M,	therefore	M*	is	
a	 determinant	 of	 M’s	 content.	According	 to	




























diacy	 of	 our	 awareness	 of	 our	 conscious	 states.	 But	 Rosenthal	 claims	 that	
HOMT	can	account	for	this	immediacy	as	well.	According	to	Rosenthal,	what	
is	required	for	S’s	awareness	of	M	to	be	immediate	is	not	that	the	formation	of	















































Let	us	 start	by	adopting	a	certain	principle	 regarding	 inferential	processes.	




The	problem	with	Rosenthal’s	 suggestion	 is	 that	M	 is	always	 unconscious	
before	the	formation	of	M*,	since	M*	is	what	bestows	consciousness	on	M.	
So	every	process	leading	from	M	to	the	formation	of	M*	would	have	to	start	
from	an	unconscious	 state,	 and	 therefore	 itself	 be	 an	unconscious	process.	
This	ensures	that	every	higher-order	representation	formed	though	a	process	






due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 their	 representation	 is	 formed	 by	 conscious	 inference	
37
The	reason	the	subject	would	necessarily	be	







insist	 that	 there	 are	 unconscious	 inferences,	








One	 might	 interpret	 the	 view	 otherwise,	
though.	The	 suggestion	might	be	 thought	 to	
be	 that	M*	 is	not	 formed	 through	any	proc-
ess,	but	rather	“forms”	somewhat	simultane-
ously	–	or	 that	 it	 is	formed	either	 though	an	






It	 is	 important	 to	 distinguish	 here	 between	
a	 process	 being	 conscious	 and	 the	 process’	
product	being	conscious.	There	are	certainly	
inferential	 processes	 whose	 product	 is	 con-
scious	 even	 though	 the	 “premises”	 are	 not.	













lacking	 the	 requisite	 immediacy.	 His	 sugge-
stion	is	that	the	former	are	unconscious	infe-
rential	processes,	whereas	 the	 latter	are	pro-
cesses	 of	 conscious	 inference.	 However,	 at	
the	beginning	of	all	these	processes,	M	is	sup-
posed	to	be	unconscious.	So	if	we	accept	the	








inference	 from	 one	 of	 one’s	 conscious	 state	
to	an	awareness	of	that	state.	But	the	aware-
ness	 formed	 through	 such	 inference	 is	 not	
the	kind	that	initially	bestows	on	the	state	its	
consciousness,	since	the	state	must	already	be	
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from these states	(before	they	are	already	conscious).	A	subject	can	certainly	




by	conscious	inference	 from M	 (or	on the basis of	M).	Rather,	 it	 is	formed	
by	 conscious	 inference	 from	 (or	 on	 the	 basis	 of)	 the	 therapist’s	 testimony.	
Rosenthal’s	account	is	incompatible	with	this,	however,	for	the	reason	pro-
vided	in	the	previous	paragraph.
Rosenthal	might	modify	his	 account	 of	 immediacy	 accordingly.	 Instead	 of	
claiming	 that	 the	difference	between	S’s	awareness	of	her	conscious	states	
and	 her	 awareness	 of	 her	 unconscious	 states	 is	 that	 the	 former	 is	 formed	
through	 unconscious	 inferential	 processes	 whereas	 the	 latter	 is	 formed	
through	conscious	inferential	processes,	he	might	suggest	that	the	former	is	
























the	 immediacy	 that	 characterizes	 the	 awareness	 we	 have	 of	 our	 conscious	
states	(and	does	not	characterize	the	awareness	we	have	of	some	of	our	un-
conscious	states).42	SOMT,	by	contrast,	faces	no	serious	difficulty	from	that	
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that	construing	consciousness	as	 relational	not	only	 is	counter-intuitive,	but	
also	brings	up	 the	 specter	of	 two	 serious	problems	 for	HOMT.	This	would	


























Another,	 related	 problem	 with	 Rosenthal’s	
original	 suggestion	 for	 distinguishing	 im-
mediate	 awareness	 from	 awareness	 lacking	
immediacy	–	 which	 I	 did	 not	 discuss	 in	 the	
main	 text	 –	 is	 brought	 up	 by	 Kobes	 (1995:	
293):	“…	suppose	that,	by	feedback	training	
or	 neurosurgery,	 I	 become	 [aware]	 of	 the…




of	 processes	 whereby	 the	 HOT	 is	 derived	
should	 cause	 loss	 of	 consciousness	 of	 the	
first-order	state”.	That	is,	it	is	absurd	to	think	











Perhaps	 the	 most	 common	 approach	 was	 to	
claim	that	even	if	mental	content	lacks	causal	














efficacy	 resides	 solely	 in	 intrinsic	properties,	
but	that	it	resides	solely	in	properties	that	su-
pervene	 on	 intrinsic	 properties	 (“locally	 su-
pervenient”	 properties).	 This	 does	 not	 make	




















































when	appropriately	represented	by	a	separate	state	of the same organism (or	
object).	But	this	reply	would	not	do.	There	are	states	of	our	skin	that	we	have	









problem	 is	 that	 we	 are	 tempted	 to	 read	 HOMT	 causally	 instead	 of	 consti-
tutively.	 If	 M*	 gave rise	 to	 consciousness	 by	 modifying	 M,	 then	 it	 would	
make	a	difference	what	characteristics	M	has	 (e.g.,	being	mental).	Thus,	 it	
could	be	claimed	that	only	states	with	such	characteristics	can	be	so	modified	
by	being	appropriately	 represented	as	 to	become	conscious.	But	 recall	 that	
SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA	
44	(2/2007)	pp.	(361–384)





characteristics	or	 not.	To	 claim	 that	 only	 a	 certain	kind	of	 internal	 state	 is	








with	 these	problems.	Those	“ways	of	dealing	with	 the	problem”	are	 likely,	
48
Thus	 Rosenthal	 (2002:	 416;	 italics	 mine):	
“It’s	easy	to	overestimate	the	degree	to	which	






has	 been	 explicitly	 propounded	 by	 some	
(Velmans	 1992,	 and	 to	 a	 significant	 extent,	
Chalmers	 1996).	 But	 I	 take	 it	 that	 it	 is	 still	
a	virtue	of	an	account	of	consciousness	 that	
it	 does	 not	 render	 consciousness	 epipheno-
menal.	 Epiphenomenalism	 is	 a	 liability,	 not	
an	attractive	feature.
50
Kim	 (1998)	 is	 responsible	 for	 reintroducing	







ine	 knowledge	 requires	 causal	 interaction,	
as	 some	 philosophers	 have	 maintained	 (e.g.	
Goldman	1967),	 there	can	be	no	knowledge	





Dretske	 (1995:	 97)	 writes:	 “Some	 people	
have	 cancer	 and	 they	 are	 conscious	 of	 hav-
ing	 it.	 Others	 have	 it,	 but	 are	 not	 conscious	
of	 having	 it.	 Are	 there,	 then,	 two	 forms	 of	
cancer:	conscious	and	unconscious	cancer?…	
Experiences	are,	in	this	respect,	like	cancers.	








ity problem.	 Since	 this	 reasoning	 applies	 to	
just	about	everything	in	nature,	we	may	also	
frame	the	problem	in	terms	of	panpsychism:	
HOMT	 appears	 to	 lead	 to	 panpsychism,	 ac-
cording	to	which	anything	in	nature	is	capa-
ble	of	consciousness.	Although	some	philoso-
phers	 have	 flirted	 with	 panpsychism	 (e.g.,	





the	 reprint	 in	 Block	 et	 al.	 1997):	 “What	 is	
it	 that	 is	 so	 special	 about	 physical	 states	 of	
that	 certain	 sort,	 that	 consciousness	of	 them	
makes	 them	 ‘conscious’?	 That	 they	 are	
themselves	mental…	It	seems	psychological	











After	 all,	 as	 we	 can	 see	 with	 Lycan’s	 view	
(see	 the	 previous	 footnote),	 there	 is	 nothing	
theoretically	(or	explanatorily)	relevant	in	the	
fact	 that	 these	states	are	mental.	The	upshot	
must	be	 that	 there	 is	an	arbitrary	fact	which	
makes	suitably	represented	mental	states,	but	
not	other	suitably	represented	internal	states,	
conscious.	 In	Lycan’s	case	 the	arbitrary	 fact	
in	question	 is	 the	fact	 that	we	are	willing	 to	
call	the	former,	but	not	the	latter,	“conscious”.	
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This	 is	 also	 connected	 to	 one	 of	 HOMT’s	
best-known	difficulties,	namely,	the	problem	
it	faces	with	second-order	misrepresentations	
of	 the	very	existence	of	 a	 first-order	mental	
state	(see	Byrne	1997,	Neander	1998,	Seager	
1999:	Ch.	3,	Levine	2001:	Ch.	4).	As	several	
authors	 have	 noted,	 this	 problem	 does	 not	




Kriegel	 2003a,	 Raymont	 Ms).	 Whether	 this	
solution	extends	 to	other	versions	of	SOMT	
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Uriah Kriegel
Die Theorie gleichrangigen Monitorings 
in der Bewusstseinsforschung
Zusammenfassung
Laut Monitoring-Ansätzen in der Bewusstseinsforschung ist ein Mentalzustand als bewusst zu 
bezeichnen, wenn er in angemessener Weise beobachtet wird. Gemäß der Theorie höherran-
gigen Monitorings sind der Zustand des Beobachtens und der Zustand des Beobachtetwerdens 
voneinander logisch unabhängig. Vertreter der Theorie gleichrangigen Monitorings bestehen 
auf einer konstitutiven, nicht-kontingenten Verbindung zwischen Beobachten und Beobach-
tetwerden. Der Verfasser dieses Beitrags artikuliert verschiedene Versionen zur Theorie gleich-




La théorie de la surveillance 
d’ordre supérieur
Résumé
Les approches dites de surveillance de la conscience affirment qu’un état peut être qualifié 
de conscient lorsqu’il est surveillé en continu. La théorie de la surveillance d’ordre supérieur 
distingue l’état surveillant et l’état surveillé comme logiquement indépendants. La théorie de la 
surveillance du même ordre soutient l’hypothèse d’une connexion constitutive et non contingen-
te entre l’état surveillant et l’état surveillé. Dans cet article, je présente diverses versions de la 
théorie de la surveillance du même ordre et j’affirme leur suprématie par rapport aux théories 
de la surveillance d’ordre supérieur.
Mots-clés
conscience,	la	théorie	d’ordre	supérieur,	la	théorie	de	même	ordre,	réprésentation	du	soi
